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Notes

A Poor Measure of the Wrong Thing:
The Food Stamp Program's Quality
Control System Discourages
Participation by Working Families
by
ED BOLEN*

Introduction
In 1998, Texas served only 51% of those poor enough to be
eligible for food stamps, yet received $19.7 million in funding from
the United States Department of Agriculture (the "USDA").'
Despite serving 70% of its eligible population, Michigan was fined
$17.7 million that year.2 The explanation for such an apparently
skewed incentive structure is found in the Food Stamp Program's
quality control ("QC") system, which provides fiscal incentives for
low error rates and penalties for high error rates. Success in other
parts of the program, including seemingly important elements such as
participation levels, goes unrewarded. As a result, the program fails
to effectively serve those who are eligible.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002. I
would like to thank David Super and Stacy Dean at the Center for Budget and Policy
Priorities, my former colleagues at California Food Policy Advocates, Professor Reuel
Schiller and Lydia Johnson.
1. 1999 USDA FOOD STAMP QUALITY CONTROL ANN. REP. 13 [hereinafter USDA
QC REPORT 1999]; ALLEN L. SCHIRM, USDA, REACHING THOSE IN NEED: STATE

FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION RATES IN 1998, at 2 (2001), available at
http:lwwv.fns.usda.gov/oane/menu/pubished/fsp/files/Participation/reading1998.pdf;
DOROTHY ROSENBAUM, erR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, IMPROVING ACCESS
TO FOOD STAMPS: NEW REPORTING OPTIONS CAN REDUCE ADMINISTRATIVE

BURDENS AND ERROR RATES 39 (2000).

2. See supra note 1.
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Food Stamp Program participation has dropped steeply since
1994 despite only a slight decrease in poverty, raising the disturbing
possibility that administrative procedures have prevented or
discouraged otherwise eligible families from participating in the
program. Participation declined from 26.2 million people in 1994 to
17.1 million people in 1998-an unprecedented 35% drop No more
than half of the decline can be attributed to increased earnings from
last decade's low unemployment and shrinking welfare rolls.4 Factors
other than ineligibility and reduced hunger appear to be at work since
"a large number of seemingly eligible families are disappearing from
the food stamp rolls" while measures of hunger and poverty remain
high.5
Administering the Food Stamp Program involves striking a
balance between the governmental interest in program accuracy and
the individual's interest in obtaining benefits to purchase food. Two
primary factors have influenced the historical balance between these
interests, resulting in program administration that discourages
participation among eligible working families. First, since the only
practical measure of the program's effectiveness relied upon by the
United States Department of Agriculture is the rate of error in
distributing benefits, administrators face tremendous pressure from
Congress and the USDA to reduce errors, often at the cost of other
program goals. Emphasis on limiting error rates has grown over the
past decade, resulting in a quality control system that pressures states
to eliminate or prevent mistakes in determining eligibility and the
quantity of food stamps issued. Second, the composition of
households seeking assistance has changed, due to adjustments in
both program eligibility requirements and systemic changes in the
economy as a whole. In particular, more households today are
earning income through part-time work, yet remain poor enough to
be eligible for food stamps. Such households have complicated
income characteristics and are thus a fertile source of administrative
error. In addition, more households have a mix of eligible and
ineligible immigrants, further complicating eligibility determinations.

3. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS, NUTRITION, & EVALUATION, USDA, THE DECLINE IN
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 25 (2001), available

at http://wwwv.fns.usda.gov/oane/menu/published/fsp/files/participation/partdecline.pdf.
4. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS, NUTRITION, & EVALUATION, USDA, WHO IS LEAVING
THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM?: AN ANALYSIS OF CASELOAD CHANGES FROM 1994 TO

1997, at 2-4 (1999), available at http:llWww.fns.usda.govloane/menu/publishedlfsplfiles/
participationlcdr.html.
5. PARKE WILDE ET AL., USDA, THE DECLINE IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION IN THE 1990'S 13 (2000), available at http://www.ers.usda.govl
publications/fanrr7l.
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These two factors have resulted in a program that places payment
accuracy above program access for the poor working-class.
This Note examines the way in which a monitoring system that is
too narrowly focused on payment accuracy has resulted in policies
that erect barriers to participation by needy families. Part One
describes the purpose of the Food Stamp Program, documents the
recent drop in participation and explains the program's monitoring
system. Part Two demonstrates how the penalty and incentive
structure established by the USDA to lower error rates has become
the dominant factor in state policy decisions. As a result, some states
have adopted policies that inhibit participation by working families,
which Part Three examines. Part Four argues that the exclusive focus
on error rates provides little in the way of program improvements.
Suggestions for improvement, including emerging congressional
proposals to revise the QC system, are discussed in part Five.
I. An Overview of the Food Stamp Program
A. The Food Stamp Program Has Recently Experienced an
Unprecedented and Partly Unexplained Drop in Participation
The Food Stamp Program is our nation's primary response to
hunger and has become a critical indicator of the health and wellbeing of low-income people in the United States. In the Food Stamp
Act of 1977, Congress explicitly stated that the program's primary
purpose is to "[raise] levels of nutrition among low-income
households" with an additional purpose of "strengthen[ing] the
Nation's agricultural economy., 6 It does this by "permit[ting] lowincome households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal
channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible
households who apply., 7 The program is a response to the
unsurprising congressional finding that the "limited food purchasing
power of low-income households contributes to hunger and
malnutrition. 'S The program is designed to provide additional
purchasing power to low-income households so that they can buy
food at a retail outlet instead of waiting in line at a church or soup
kitchen. There is almost universal agreement that the program
6. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 2 (1977). This statement represents
a reordering of priorities from the original Food Stamp Act of 1964, which stated that the
purpose of food stamps was to "strengthen the agricultural economy; to help achieve a
fuller and more effective use of food abundances; to provide for improved levels of
nutrition among low-income households." Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, §
1 (1964).
7. 7 U.S.C.S. § 2011 (2000).
8. Food Stamp Act of 1977 § 2.
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provides critical assistance to low-income households. For example,
studies show that food stamp recipients buy more nutrition per dollar
of food stamp expenditure than non-food stamp recipients.' The
program has documented success in reducing hunger, improving
nutrition, alleviating 2 overty and integrating low-income consumers
into the marketplace.
In addition, food stamps provide a critical source of financial
assistance for those who participate. Food stamps can increase a
minimum wage worker's monthly income by 33% or more.1 For
example, a family of three, where the single parent works thirty hours
a week at minimum wage, would receive over $250 a month in food
stamps, representing a 41% increase in monthly income." Moreover,
the Food Stamp Program is one of the most broadly available benefit
programs for low-income households. When coupled with receipt of
the Earned Income Tax Credit, many minimum-wage families can
reach or even exceed the poverty line.'
Despite the program's success, it has served a declining number
of eligible households in the last decade. Between 1994 and 1997, the
percent of those eligible for food stamps who participated in the
program dropped from 71% to 62% even though a fairly consistent
number of people remained eligible due to persistent poverty rates

throughout the 1990S.14 Participation rates fell in every region of the
country and in all but five states." This statistic is troubling because it
indicates that a large number of people considered in need of
nutritional assistance are not participating in the program. There is
little evidence that the need for food stamps is going away. In fact,
about 10 million people lived in households where at least one person
experienced hunger in 1998 and emergency food providers have
reported a steady increase in demand over the last several years.1
9. CALIFORNIA FOOD POLICY ADVOCATES, CALIFORNIA FOOD STAMP FACTS

(1998), availableat http://cfpa.net/foodstamps.food%20stamps.htm.
10. See Rafael Pdrez Escamilla et al., Food Stamps Are Associated with Food Security
and Dietary Intake of Inner-City Preschoolers, 130 J. NUTRITION 2711 (2000); Donald
Rose et al., Household Participationin the Food Stamp and WIC ProgramsIncreases the
NutrientIntakes of PreschoolChildren,128 J. NUTRITION 548 (1998) (showing increases in
five critical nutrients among preschoolers whose households received food stamps).
11. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 1.
12. STACY DEAN & SHARON PAROTr, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
FOOD STAMPS CAN HELP LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES PUT FOOD ON THE TABLE

3 (1999). This calculation makes several assumptions regarding family expenses and
possible deductions.
13. Id at 1.
14. SCHIRM, supra note 1, at 2.

15. Id.
16. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, USDA, HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE

1
(1999), available at
(ADVANCE REPORT)
UNITED STATES 1995-98
http:llwww.fns.usda.govloanelMENU/PublishedlFSP/Fileslfsecsum.htm; see also SECOND
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Recently, participation has shifted from households receiving
cash assistance to those with earned income, due in part to changes in
welfare law that limit assistance and require work. 7 The share of
food stamp households that also received welfare dropped from
41.9% in 1989 to 31.4% in 1998, while the share of food stamp
households with earnings increased from 19.6% to 26.3% over the
same time period.18 Despite comprising a greater proportion of the
food stamp rolls, only about half of all eligible individuals in working
families participate.19 The declining levels of participation by eligible
households may help explain the puzzling trend that, despite the once
booming economy, the income of the poorest of all single parent
families actually declined between 1995 and 1999.0
B.

How Do Households Get Food Stamps?

Food stamps are provided to households that meet federal
eligibility standards and comply with certain program requirements,
such as work registration.2' The program's eligibility requirements
are admittedly complicated. In order to target the neediest of
households and respond to food purchasing needs that change with
even small deviations in financial resources, the program takes an
extensive "snapshot" of a household's income, resources and
expenses.' Thus, the food stamp agency needs to ask for and then
verify a wide variety of information about each applicant. Once a
household is found eligible, the agency tracks certain characteristics
to ensure continued eligibility and a close match between benefits and
need.' At least once a year, the household must essentially reapply."
Many people with incomes below 130% of the federal poverty
level are eligible for food stamps, but the application process can be
daunting. Initiating the process usually requires a trip to the food

HARVEST, HUNGER 1997: THE FACES & FACTS, available at http://www.secondharvest.

org/policy/hungerstudy/section3.html (last visited Mar. 26,2001).
17. LAURA CASTNER & RANDY Rosso, USDA, CHARACTERISTICS OF FOOD STAMP
HOUSEHOLDS FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 22 (2000), availableat http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/

menu/published/fsp/files/participation/char98.pdf.
18. 1& at 65.
19. LAURA CASTNER, USDA, TRENDS IN FSP PARTICIPATION RATES: Focus ON
1994 TO 1998, at 18 (2000), available at http:llwww.fns.usda.gov/oane/menu/published/fsp/
files/participation/trendsl994-1998.pdf.
20. Press Release, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Poverty Level Hits Lowest Level
Since 1979 as Unemployment Reaches a 30-Year Low (Oct. 10, 2000), at
http://www.cbpp.org/9-26-00pov.htm.
21. See generally 7 C.F.R. § 273.1-273.11 (2000); 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d) (2000).
22. 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (2000).
23. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(c) (2000).
24. Id.
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stamp or welfare office in order to obtain an application.2 The
application form can be overwhelming, especially to those with
limited English skills. The average length of an application is 12
pages, though it runs over twenty pages in ten states, and reaches
thirty-six pages in Minnesota.26 In fact, the average food stamp
application is six times longer than the federal application for a
firearms permit and three times as long as the federal home mortgage
loan application. 27 Once an application is filed, the office will request
and then verify (either by requesting documentation from the
applicant or seeking independent confirmation) proof of income,
identity, immigration status, home address (with special rules for
homeless people and migrant workers), utility expenses, information
about household composition, other expenses, resources and
deductions for expenses, like childcare.' One interview is required
and applicants unable to 2Vrovide all the required information are
forced to interview again. Once found eligible, participants must
recertify, or essentially confirm their continued eligibility, on a
regular and often frequent basis."
The Food Stamp Program deals with the challenges presented by
fluctuations of earned income by requiring that agencies closely track
household income through a reporting system.31 While eligible
households are certified to receive food stamps for a fixed period of
time, that time can range from one month to one year.32 From the
perspective of an agency that faces an increasing number of
households with earned income, requiring a full recertification has the
advantage of forcing a household to come into the office, submit to a
face-to-face interview and provide an updated set of verifiable
documents. This, of course, places a greater burden on the working
household. The average recertification takes two and one half hours
and at least one trip to a food stamp office, which is usually open only

25. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c) (2000). Applications may be available at some nonprofit
organizations, but the applicant would need to know this and would still need to make a
trip. See id.
26. DOUG O'BRIEN ET AL., THE RED TAPE DIVIDE: STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF
FOOD STAMP APPLICATIONS 15-17 (2000), available at http://www.secondharvest.org/
policy/foodstamp-study.html.
27. Id. at 15.
28. FOOD RESEARCH & ACTION CTR., FRAC's GUIDE TO THE FOOD STAMP

PROGRAM 50-53 (10th ed. 1999).
29. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(e)(1) (2000).
30. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f) (2000).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)-(f) (2000).
32. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.12; 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f)(6)-(7) (2000). Recent changes in these
regulations state "[h]ouseholds should be assigned certification periods of at least six
months" unless special circumstances indicate otherwise. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f)(3)(i).
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during working hours.' In addition, in 16% of recertifications, the
household has to go to additional locations (often other government
offices) to obtain necessary information and 65% of households had
out-of-pocket expenses averaging close to $6 per recertification.3
During the recertification period, the household continues
receiving stamps so long as it remains eligible and reports changes to
income and other circumstances that could affect benefit levels.3 The
state has a number of options regarding what must be reported and
when. Some states require monthly reports, even if there is no
change in the household's circumstances. 36 Others require households
31
to report only certain changes within ten days of their occurrence.
C. Monitoring the Program
While the Food Stamp Act establishes national eligibility and
implementation standards for the Food Stamp Program, each state is
ultimately responsible for administration.3 8 The federal government
pays all benefit costs and 50% of the administrative costs of the
state. In order to ensure that states operate the program within
federal guidelines, the USDA monitors state performance by
generally reviewing the state's management practices and specifically
validating the state's error rate through the QC system. 0 Every state
must analyze the data it collects in these reviews and if the analysis
indicates unsatisfactory performance, the state agency must plan,
implement and monitor corrective actions."
The purpose of the food stamp QC system is to provide a
"systematic method of measuring the validity of the food stamp
caseload."' 2 While the effectiveness of the Food Stamp Program
could be measured in many ways, the USDA focuses solely on the
misallocation of benefits, admitting its QC system is the "primary tool
for evaluating the states' performance."43 Little other evaluation or
33. MICHAEL PONZA ET AL., USDA, CUSTOMER SERVICE IN THE FOOD STAMP

PROGRAM 43-44 (1999), available at http:l/www.fns.usda.gov/oane/menu/published/fsp/
files/program%20operations/fspcust.pdf. Some food stamp offices open early or stay open
late, but federal requirements that they remain accessible to working people were deleted
years ago.
34. Id. at 42,45.
35. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f) (2000).
36. 7 C.F.R. § 273.21(b) (2000); 7 U.S.C. § 2015(c)(1)(A) (2000).
37. 7 C.F.R. § 273.12(a) (2000).
38. 7 C.F.R. § 275.1(a) (2000).
39. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(a) (2000).
40. 7 C.F.R. § 275.3(a)-(c) (2000).
41. 7 C.F.R. § 275.16 (2000).
42. 7 C.F.R. § 275.10(b) (2000).
43. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REDUCING FOOD STAMP BENEFIT
OVERPAYMENTS AND TRAFFICKING: STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. ROBINSON 4 (1997),
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monitoring is conducted by the USDA and "it is hard to overstate...
the degree of emphasis that [the] USDA places on payment
accuracy."' 4 The Food Stamp Act explicitly states that it seeks to
"enhance payment accuracy by establishing fiscal incentives."45 The
liability structure requires states with high error rates to "share in the
cost of payment error" and provides extra administrative funding to
states with the lowest error rates.46
Part of the emphasis on payment accuracy can be attributed to
congressional sensitivity to program fraud and error. "Fraud" exists
when a recipient deliberately provides incorrect information in order
to obtain or increase benefits or when a retailer exchanges food
stamps for cash (instead of food) or sets up a sham operation that
sells no food.47 "Errors" are inadvertent mistakes made by the
households receiving or applying for food stamps or by the agency.
In fiscal year 1999, 84% of all overpayments were non-fraud While
fraud receives more public scrutiny, errors in payments constitute a
larger percentage of misallocation, recently estimated to equal 7% of
all benefits issued.49

Payment errors that impose liability on a state occur when the
amount of food stamps issued to the household is determined upon
review to be incorrect." Errors occur in a variety of contexts. The
food stamp administrator could miscalculate eligibility or benefit
levels either by honest error or by failure to collect and confirm the
relevant information. Alternatively, the recipient may fail to report a
change in income or household composition. Over half of all errors
(56%) are due to agency error, the remaining are due to household
error (44%). 1 Most importantly, both over and under issuances
count as errors, but improper denials are not considered errors.
D. The QC System: Determining Payment Errors, But Ignoring Improper
Denials

To monitor the accuracy of benefit issuance, states are required
to review a statistically valid sample of its caseload, comprised of both
households participating in the program and those who have been
availableat http://www.gao.gov.
44. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 3.

45. 7U.S.C. §2025(c) (2000).
46. Id.
47. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 43, at 3-4.
48. DAVID SUPER, CrR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, FOOD STAMP
OVERPAYMENT ERROR RATE HITS RECORD Low 5 n.2 (rev. ed. 2001), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/4-30-Olfs.htm.
49. Id. at 2-3.
50. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(2) (2000).
51. USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 35.
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denied, suspended or terminated. 2
Households currently
participating are reviewed to determine if the household is indeed
eligible and, if so, if the correct amount of food stamps are being
issued.53
Not all differences between a household's actual
circumstances and the food stamp agency's case file constitute QC
errors. ' Many variances are harmless and not considered errors,
including most importantly, any variance "in an element of eligibility
or basis of issuance which was not reported and was not required to
have been reported."55 Under this rule, in which only reported
information can constitute an error, a thirty-six-page application that
asks for surplus information exposes a state agency to an increased
and unnecessary likelihood of error.
Cases in which the household has been denied or terminated are
also reviewed, but not as intensely. These cases are usually subject
only to a review of the food stamp agency's case file. 6 Only when
that record fails to show that the household is ineligible is direct
contact with the applicant required." This is a lower level of reviewif a termination or denial is based on an inaccurate piece of
information in the case record, QC review will not discover it merely
from looking at the file itself. Almost all states' negative error rates
are consistently lower than their active cases."
The federal QC review consists of an analysis of a subset of the
state's sample. When the USDA conducts its review to determine if a
state is to be sanctioned for high error rates, it only looks at the
combined error rate of the currently participating households. 9
Terminations and denial errors are not included at all.6 This policy
encourages states to limit errors made to participating households,
but allows states to neglect problems dealing with improperly denied
or terminated households. While those wrongly terminated or denied
have a right to a fair hearing, they are often unaware of or unable to
participate in that process. Such a policy can also result in a

52. 7 C.F.R. § 275.11(e) (2000). The review involves an evaluation of the food stamp
agency's case file and a field investigation, which can include personal interviews and
verification of information from additional parties. See 7 C.F.R .§ 275.12(b)-(c) (2000).
53. 7 C.F.R. § 275.12(a) (2000).
54. 7 C.F.R. § 275.12(d)(2) (2000).
55. Id.
56. 7 C.F.R. § 275.13(b) (2000).
57. Id.
58. See USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 13, 19.
59. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(2) (2000).
60. See id. The USDA does assess the accuracy of terminations and denials, but only
for states eligible for extra federal funding because they have very low error rates among
participating households. 7 C.F.R. § 275.23(d) (2000). In addition, the USDA has
recently indicated it will begin reviewing all terminations and denials.
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phenomenon known as "churning"-denying or terminating eligible
households who will later reapply.
Both overissuance (too many benefits to an eligible household)
and underissuance (too few benefits to households that receive at
least some) are considered errors, and the USDA sums the two to
reach a "combined error rate" for the state. By doing so, it presents a
number greater than the actual fiscal cost of payment errors, which
would be more accurately represented by netting the two. For
example, if a state incorrectly overissued 5% of its benefits and
underissued 3%, the total misallocation (and cost to the government)
is 2%, but the state's combined error rate is 8%. Though perhaps an
acceptable measure of performance, the combined error rate does not
illustrate the amount of excessive federal expenditures resulting from
error because it includes underpayments that actually save the
government money."
Focusing on only one measure of the program-payment
accuracy-limits the effectiveness of federal oversight because, as
experts in QC have noted, the success of any QC system depends on
the objectives to be achieved and the environment in which the
program operates.62 The food stamp QC system's narrow focus on
payment accuracy results in substantial information about state error
rates, but as discussed below, little in the way of program
improvements.
H. The USDA's Carrot and Stick Approach to Error Rates
A. The QC System Pressures States to Reduce Error Rates

States with combined error rates above the national average are
sanctioned and face a fiscal penalty.63 These fiscal penalties are not
insignificant and serve to put states under fiscal pressure to reduce
their error rates. In 1998, the pre-adjusted liability was $78.16
million, with eleven states facing $1 million or more in sanctions." In
1999, the USDA assessed states $74.77 million in penalties, adjusted
down to $30.63 million after the USDA factored in the effect that5
different characteristics in the populations served had on error rates.
Michigan alone faced a $31 million penalty. 66
61. SUPER, supra note 48, at 2.
62. RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL: A NEW SYSTEM FOR THE FOOD STAMP

PROGRAM 103 (Dennis P. Affholter & Fredrica D. Kramer eds., 1987) [hereinafter
RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL].

63. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(1) (2000).
64. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 39.
65. Id. at 40.

66. Id.
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The USDA's authority to collect the sanctions gives it a great
deal of flexibility in determining the timing, amount and form of
payment.67 Not surprisingly, states have vigorously opposed the
imposition of these fiscal sanctions.'
State administrators loath
incurring penalties because they must seek funding to pay them from
state legislators who are likely to be resistant and may question the
ability and effectiveness of an administrator whose agency is being
penalized for inaccuracies.
After states continued to accrue unpaid sanctions and the USDA
struggled to get the states to pay, Congress responded in several ways.
In 1993, after the states initiated several legal challenges to the
sanction system, the USDA negotiated a plan with the states to waive
85% of the total sanctions a state owed, provided that the state
reinvest the remaining 15% in the USDA-approved error rate
reduction activities. 69 However, the 15% still comes from the state
coffers. Although the money is redirected back into the state agency,
states continue to find it burdensome because it must be used in
limited, USDA-approved ways and "represents an 70appropriation of
state funds it likely would not have made otherwise.,
Another strategy employed by the USDA involves "at risk"
agreements between a state and the USDA. Under this strategy, the
USDA agrees to delay the collection of sanctions so long as the state
reaches an agreed-upon error rate reduction.'
This strategy was
abandoned in 1998 for all but one state, but between 1992 and 1997,
the USDA placed $145 million "at risk" under this approach'
Because states could accrue new sanctions and be liable for the full
quantity placed "at risk," they faced intense pressure to lower error
rates as soon as possible.
B. Enhanced Funding Pressures States to Continue Lowering Error Rates
States with error rates below 5.9% and a negative case error rate
below the national average are eligible to receive enhanced federal
administrative funding.'
While only six states qualified for this
funding in 1998, they received a total of $39 million. An additional
67. 7 U.S.C. §2025(c)(1)(C) (2000).
6S. RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL, supra note 62, at 1-5. The purpose of the panel
and the report it generated was to address the tension between states and the federal
government when the latter began imposing heavy sanctions.
69. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 6.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id.
73. 7 C.F.R. § 275.23(d)(2)(ii) (2000). The enhanced funding threshold is fixed by
regulation at 5.9%, while the sanction threshold is set by the national average, which
changes each year.
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ten states, who were in no danger of being sanctioned, were within
two percentage points of the 5.9% threshold for enhanced funding,
close enough to stand a realistic chance of gaining these funds.74
Enhanced funding can be a powerful incentive for a state to
enact policies that reduce error rates, in part because the funding can
be spent on virtually any state activity in contrast to the restricted use
of the 15% sanction reinvestment funds. Texas has touted its recent
receipt of these enhanced funds, as its error rate has dropped from
12.45% in 1994 (well above the national average of 10.32%) to 5.2%
in 1999 (well below the national average of 9.86%). 75 It is worth
noting that the Texas Legislature required the Department of Human
Services to provide semi-annual "Error Reduction Progress Reports"
as a condition of receiving the state funds it owed for its high error
rates in the early 1990s. Due to this decrease, Texas qualified to
receive $19.7 million in federal enhanced funding in 1998.6 The
majority of the funding was used for a program that provided
financial incentives for nursing homes "to increase quality
outcomes."' Additional funds were spent on staff bonuses, a summer
feeding program for children, food stamp outreach and customer
service training. Only $350,000 of the $19.7 million went into the
Food Stamp Program, the remaining $19.35 million was spent in other
ways.'
The consequence of using only one carrot (enhanced funding)
and one stick (sanctions) to monitor the state administration of the
program is a policy based on a very narrow view of the program's
purpose and effectiveness. Focusing almost entirely on payment
accuracy encourages states to lower error rates at any cost. For
instance, some states choose error reduction policies that have the
result of limiting participant access to the program.

74. 1998 USDA FOOD STAMP PROGRAM QUALITY CONTROL ANN. REP. 13
[hereinafter USDA QC REPORT 1998].
75. TEx. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, QUALITY CONTROL ERROR REDUCTION
PROGRESS REPORT 2 (1999), available at http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/publications/
errorSept99/index.html.
76. Id.
77. Ctr. for Public Policy & Priorities, The Policy Page (Jan. 23, 2001), at
http:lwww.cppp.orglproducts/policypages/l11-130/111-130html/PPlll.html.
78. Id.
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Il.The QC Structure Creates Incentives for States to Adopt
Policies that Adversely Affect Participants and Applicants
A.

Some States Target Working Households Because They are ErrorProne

One strategy for lowering error rates and avoidin penalties is
for states to target "error prone" households.
Certain
circumstances, like fluctuating incomes or changing household
composition, present an increased opportunity for error. One reason
earned income is a likely source of error is the extensive
documentation required to track small changes in income. Because
the program is designed to match benefit level closely with need-a
change of $3 in income results in roughly a $1 change in food stamp
benefits-the agency must precisely determine a household's
income.' Another reason is the nature of low-wage work. Many
poor working households have adult members who work part-time or
at several jobs.81 Many do not have fixed hours of employment-they
work when they can.' These uncertain circumstances complicate the
income determinations because food stamp benefits are usually based
on the future anticipated income of a household for the month in
which the stamps are to be issued.
The average error rate in 1998 was nearly twice as high among
households with earnings as among those without earnings.' In
addition, while 30.2% of the benefits were issued to households with
at least some earned income, 43.6% of the incorrectly issued benefits
were issued to households with earned income." Between 1997 and
1998, all states showed increased error rates among households with
earned income. 5 In response, some states began assigning threemonth certification periods to households with earned income rather
than continuing to rely solely on monthly reporting." Reporting is
79. There are many ways states seek to limit errors without directly choosing policies
that impact participants and applicants that usually consist of training and increased
supervision. See USDA, STRIKING THE BALANCE: MAINTAINING SERVICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 1-11 (3d. ed. 1999)[hereinafter STRIKING THE BALANCE].

80.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATES SEEK TO REDUCE PAYMENT ERRORS

AND COMPLEXITY 17 n.11 (2001), availableat http://www.gao.gov.
81. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A PROFILE OF THE

WORKING POOR, 1999, at 1 (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/pdflcpswp99.pdf.
82. GREGORY Acs ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, PLAYING BY THE RULES BUT
LOSING THE GAME: AMERICA'S WORKING POOR 12-13 (2000).

83.
84.
85.
86.

USDA QC REPORT 1998, supra note 74, at 57,61.
Id.
ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 10.
See STRIKING THE BALANCE, supra note 79, at 3-4; TEX. DEP'T OF HUMAN

SERVICES, supra note 75, at 4.
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done through the mail, using a simple form, while recertification
involves a much more complicated and time-intensive process. The
frequent recertification of households with earned income may
increase the likelihood of errors, since other eligibility elements that
need not be reported must also be recertified.
States that have aggressively shortened certification periods for
households with earnings also saw a disproportionate decline in
participation among those households.' Table 1 shows the eleven
states that have increased three-month certifications by at least 50%
among households with children and earned income. All but three
show that participation decreased at a rate at least twice that of the
national average. Among these states, the number of working
families receiving food stamps fell 29% over the four year period,
while in the rest of the nation, the drop was less than one percent.
In addition, of the five states with the largest declines among working
families between 1994 and 1998, four are on this list (Indiana, Texas,
Ohio and Arizona). Even the state with the fifth largest decline in
participation among working families, Utah, just missed being on the
list by increasing its proportion of working families with three-month
recertifications by 35%, not 50% .8
TABLE 1: STATES WITH THREE-MONTH CERTIFICATIONS FOR
HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN AND EARNED INCOME'
State

Percentage of
households with 3month

Percentage of
households with 3month

Percent change in
participation among
these households:

Rank of state in top
twelve state
declines among

certifications: 1994

certifications: 1999

1994-1998

working households

Arizona

1

64

-28

4

Georgia

5

62

-1

Indiana

1

54

-43

1

Maine

24

86

-22

10

Missouri

2

92

-22

N. Carolina

1

76

2

Ohio

1

78

-30

Oklahoma

11

84

-21

11

Texas

3

62

-34

2

Virginia

3

71

-13

Wisconsin

1

65

-6

US

9

31

-5

87.

ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 7-9.
88. Id. at 9; USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 13.
89. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 9.
90. Id. at 7-9.

9
_

3

_
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Such a correlation between shortened certification and decreased
participation is not surprising, considering the increased burden that
shortened certification periods place on working families, most
obviously in the form of time away from work to attend
recertification interviews. Increasing the number of certifications an
agency is required to conduct also increases the number of times an
employer is called on to confirm the earned income reported by a
participant. Not only does this put a food stamp recipient in the
awkward position of repeatedly revealing her food stamp status (and
the stigma associated with it) to her employer, there are indications
that employers resent the continued intrusion into their employment
relations by eligibility administrators.9 ' Additionally, requiring
working families to certify more often increases the agency's
paperwork burden and the likelihood of error rises since there are
more opportunities for the agency or household to err.
No similarly steep decline in participation occurs among states
with six-month or one-year certifications. 2 This suggests that the
three-month policy itself is, in part, cause of the decline. States that
chose this policy are discouraging working families from participating
in the Food Stamp Program.
B. Texas Conducts Pre-certification Investigations to Screen Out "High
Risk" Participants

As another example of an error reduction strategy that affects
participation, Texas identifies at-risk households by using
predetermined criteria. Investigators "typically conduct home visits
and make face-to-face contact with third-party sources... at the time
of initial application." 93 That is, before a household is determined
eligible, it may be contacted by the food stamp agency, visited at
home, and asked to allow third parties (like employers and
neighbors) to meet with the investigators. 94 Despite the increased

stigma that this places on applicants, only 22% of the households
subject to the at-risk procedure had any change (including ones not

91. AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVICES ASS'N, ISSUE BRIEF: WHY THE FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM No LONGER MEETS THE NEEDS OF THE WORKING POOR 6-7 (2001) ("A

typical employer response... written on the verification form... 'THIS MAY BE YOUR
SECOND REQUEST, BUT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS HAS BEEN
RECEIVED IN OUR OFFICE! THESE FORMS ARE ALWAYS COMPLETED ON
MY TIME AND WITH MY TAX MONEYM!!"'), at http:/wwv.aphsa.org/issues/
fstamps.htm (last visited March 1, 2001).
92. Interview with Stacy Dean, Director, Food Stamp and Immigrant Policy, Ctr. on
Budget & Policy Priorities, in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 8,2001).
93. TEx. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 75, at 4.
94. These techniques go far beyond the statutory requirements. See 7 C.F.R. §

273.2(f)(4)-(5) (2000).
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considered errors by QC reviewers) made to their files. Even fewer
were found to be in error.95
For long-time observers of welfare programs, this may seem
eerily familiar. In the mid 1980s, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services imposed a sanction policy to encourage payment
accuracy in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (the
"AFDC") program. States practiced "verification extremism" by
conducting home visits and "the routine questioning of neighbors and
landlords as methods of verifying eligibility. 9 6 Numerous incidents of
denied benefits and applicants churning in and out of the system were
documented.'
Texas presents a cautionary tale. It experienced one of the
steepest declines in error rates between 1994 and 1999, as noted
above, making it eligible for millions in enhanced funding.
Its
aggressive
error-reduction
strategy included
three-month
recertifications and precertification investigations on high risk
households." During the same period (1994 to 1998), participation in
the Food Stamp Program in Texas fell 48.6%, while the national
decline over the same time period was 32.8%." Although some of
the drop may be due to the relatively high number of immigrants
Texas serves (many of whom may have lost eligibility under the 1996
welfare reform act), the drop is significantly larger than other highimmigrant
states like Californa (36% drop) and New York (28.5%
0
drop).1 1
C.

Outreach Efforts May Be Discouraged In Order to Avoid Errors

In 1999, California had no error rate sanction after adjusting its
error rate to account for the disproportionate number of immigrants
and working-poor participating in the program."° When sanctioned,
it is California's policy to share the liability among the counties.""
Because there was no state sanction in 1999, Los Angeles had no
95. Id.
96. Timothy J. Casey & Mary R. Mannix, Ctr. on Soc. Policy and Law, Quality Control
in Public Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided Accountability, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1381, 1385 (1989).
97. Id.
98. TEx. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, QUALITY CONTROL ERROR REDUCTION
PROGRESS REPORT 1-2 (2000).
99. Tax. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 75, at 4-5.
100. USDA, REACHING THOSE IN NEED: STATE FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION
RATES IN 1998, at 4 (2001).
101. Id.
102. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 40.
103. Letter from George Manalo-LeClair, Director, California Food Policy Advocates,
to Gary Swanson, Chief, Food Stamp Branch of California (May 30, 2001)(on file with
author).
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county level sanction imposed. The county embarked on an
ambitious outreach effort to increase participation by 35% and
granted discretion to district agency directors to develop plans and
° As part of that effort, posters encouraging administrators
materials.'O
to meet the enrollment goal were posted in food stamp offices. The
following year, California faced an $11.9 million sanction, which it
prorated to counties based on county caseloads. Los Angeles was
allocated $8.5 million in penalties. 5 In turn, the outreach posters in
the food stamp offices were replaced with posters urging
The required county error
administrators to decrease errors.'
reduction plan is currently being created by the fraud and QC
division, with little or no input from any other department, showing
the disconnect between QC and every facet of the Food Stamp
Program.
IY.Flaws in the QC System
The fundamental flaw in the QC system is that it is the wrong
tool for the task at hand-measuring the states' administration of the
Food Stamp Program. Even as a narrow measure of program
integrity, the current QC system establishes a poor set of incentives,
as described above. When viewed in light of the broader purpose of
the Food Stamp Program, to prevent hunger and improve nutrition
among low-income households, the QC system falls far short of
providing the correct incentives and sanctions. While it is true that
concerns about the effectiveness of the program and a justification for
the QC system is fraud and abuse within the program, two significant
sources of fraud-the misuse of food stamps by participants (usually
selling them for cash) and fraud among retailers-are not policed in
the current QC system.
A critique of the current system cannot ignore its benefits and
successes. For one thing, it may have discouraged fraud among
reporting households (though no data exists to confirm this) by
establishing procedures to review and investigate discrepancies
between agency files and household information. Also, the current
system provides significant data about issuance accuracy, it prescribes
a thorough and accurate sampling system and has provided a
historical (though perhaps misleading) benchmark with which to
104.

SUSAN CHEN ET AL., CALIFORNIA FOOD POLICY ADVOCATES, BEST PRACrICES

TO IMPROVE THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM IN CALIFORNIA 26 (2000).

105. Letter from George Manalo-LeClair, Director, California Food Policy Advocates,
to Gary Swanson, Chief, Food Stamp Branch of California (May 30, 2001)(on file with
author).
106. Interview with George Manalo-LeClair, Director, California Food Policy
Advocates in San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 24,2001).
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measure payment accuracy. In fact, it appears to have helped in
lowering error rates to roughly the level maintained over the last ten
years. In 1981 the combined error rate was 12.4% while in 1999 it was
9.86%. During the early 1990s, the error rate increased slightly. 7
However, as discussed below, the usefulness of the QC sanctioning
system today is not as clear as it may have been.
A. Setting the National Average as the Threshold for Sanctions Means
Half of All States Must Fail

States are sanctioned if they exceed the national average error
rate for the current year.1°' Since the current year's average is not
known until after all individual state error rates are calculated, states
do not know how low their error rate must be to avoid sanction.
While this helps to ratchet down the error rate, by pressuring states to
aim low, comparison to the national average is not a particularly
meaningful measure of a state's overall effectiveness. It merely
indicates how a particular state performed in relation to other states
that year, but does not indicate whether a particular level of error is
acceptable or not. The national average has ranged from 12.40% in
1981 to 9.23% in 1996.'°9 In the 1980s, the target error rate was
changed from a fixed rate of 5% to the national average, in part,
because the states and the USDA considered 5% to be an unrealistic
level."' If the national average were to double next year, there would
still be a comparable number of state winners and losers, but program
performance would have sharply worsened.
Levels of error in similar benefit programs do not seem to be
particularly helpful in establishing an error rate that reflects program
priorities. While similar programs, like the AFDC and Medicaid, had
lower error rates in the 1980s, they measured errors in very different
ways."' When those discrepancies were factored in, the Food Stamp
Program's error rate was comparable. 2 Today, there is no
comparable error rate measurement in the Temporary Assistance for

107. See RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL, supra note 62, at 47; USDA QC REPORT
1999, supra note 1, at 11.
108. 7 C.F.R. § 275.23(e)(5)(ii) (2000) ("For any fiscal year in which a State agency's
payment error rate exceeds the national performance measure for the fiscal year...
109. USDA QC REPORT 1998, supranote 74, at 11.
110. RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL, supra note 62, at 88. In fact, the error rate
target changed from a static 5% to "the lowest ever national average plus 1%" in 1988 to
the current national average. Such variety underscores the arbitrariness of the measure.
111. BOB GREENSTEIN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A COMPARISON OF
FOOD STAMP, MEDICAID, AND AFDC ERROR RATES: Is THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
POORLY MANAGED? 10 (1985).

112. Id. at 3.
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Needy Families ("TANF") program, the AFDC replacement, nor in
Medicaid.
Because the sampling method used to determine error rates can
result in some fluctuations in results, states close to the national
average (or even below it) face the possibility of a fiscal sanction in
the following year. For example, when Pennsylvania's error rate was
9.85% in 1998 when the national average was 10.7%, sampling
variance and statistical fluctuations meant that Pennsylvania
continued to face a substantial risk of penalty even though its
performance and the national average stayed the same. 3 In fact,
Pennsylvania faced almost $600,000 in penalties in 1999 (before
adjustments for demographics, as described above) because its error
rate was 10.79% and the national average was 9.86%."' While
Pennsylvania's accuracy in providing benefits changed by less than
one percent, the state found itself facing a $600,000 fine because the
national average had shifted. To avoid the possibility of sanctions,
states must aim well below the national average for that year.
B. Standards that Penalize a Large Number of States are Too Stringent

By setting the standard error rate at a national average, the Food
Stamp Act creates a situation in which, by definition, close to half the
states must fail. In fact, between 1994 and 1999, 40 states were
sanctioned at least once."5 Forty seven states were either sanctioned
or faced a threat of sanctioning because they were within one
percentage point of the national average. 6 An independent study of
QC in the federal benefit programs, commissioned by Congress,
recommended that only the significant outliers-those states
significantly above or below the threshold-should be subject to
penalties or enhanced funding. Indeed, the commission noted "there
is something wrong with a QC system that 'finds' that nearly all of the
operational units are performing poorly in the face of... improved
performance.' 17 Despite relatively low error rates in recent years, the
national average threshhold still sanctions many states."' While QC
data for fiscal year 2000 shows a record low in overpayments and a
declining underpayment error rate, the number of states subject to

113. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 5-6 n.4.
114. USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 13.
115. USDA QC REPORT 1998, supra note 74, at 13; USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra
note 1, at 13.
116. USDA QC REPORT 1998, supra note 74, at 13; USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra
note 1, at 13.
117. RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL, supra note 62, at 142. At the time of this
report, the threshhold sanctioned up to 45 states each year.
118. USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 11.
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sanctions
119 rose and the total amount of sanctions rose an astonishing
50%.
C. Adjustments in The Definition of Error That Have Nothing to do With
State Performance Can Significantly Affect Error Rates
Errors are defined in the Food Stamp Act as "payment errors"
and specifically exclude harmless variances, errors made under newly
issued regulations and errors based on incorrect information or policy
interpretation by the USDA." But even that definition is somewhat
flexible. Effective in fiscal year 2000, the USDA permanently raised
the threshold dollar error from $5 to $25, in recognition that small
errors are likely in households with complicated income.12 1 That
adjustment alone resulted in an average drop of two-thirds of a
percentage point in states' error rates. While that may not sound
like much, it is significant: between 1995 and 1997, the national
average fluctuated by less than two-thirds of a percentage point. 3
While it does improve a state's error rate, redefining what constitutes
an error has no correlation to improvements in program
management. It also does not help states avoid sanctions once it
lowers the national average.
Additionally, some states have claimed that they should not be
held accountable for client errors such as incorrect reporting, lack of
required documentation or the failure to inform the food stamp office
of required changes because those errors do not reflect an agency's
performance. Approximately 57% of the errors in fiscal year 1999
were attributed to agency action." Ignoring the remaining 43% of
the errors because they were caused by participant action would
obviously lower the overall error rates, without any improvement in
program administration. While states argue that such events do not
reflect the quality of agency administration, in fact, an agency's
actions can have significant influence on client error. For instance,
the amount of training and general competence of the administrators
will affect their ability to ask the right questions and obtain the
necessary information. Errors made by a household may occur
because the administrator is confusing, ill-prepared or overwhelmed.
Applicants, far less versed in the program's requirements, may not
know what kinds of documentation are needed, nor that specific
circumstances (like medical or child care costs) may impact benefit
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

SUPER, supra note 48, at 1.
7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(3) (2000).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 14.
ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 10-11.
USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 13.
RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL, supra note 62, at 91.
USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 39.
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levels. In addition, there is some concern that the recent economic
boom has made it difficult for states to attract and retain qualified
administrators.126

Lastly, one notable trend in the Food Stamp Program since the
mid-1990s has been the increased ability of states to opt out of federal
regulations, thus allowings states to experiment with new approaches
or tailor their program to better allign with the state cash assistance
programs replacing the AFDC."z States have also begun using
waivers, which often substantially change the reporting and
recertification requirements." Other waivers, however, streamline
the more complicated program rules around vehicle and shelter
costs. 29 Waivers can affect the administrative workload, the
requirements imposed on households and the likelihood of errors.
While federal QC reviewers are required to factor in state waivers
when determining errors, states that have removed a key source of
error by use of a waiver will have fewer error-prone situations than a
state that has not done so' 3o Because earned income and deductions
account for 87% of all errors, states that have waivers impacting these
areas of error will have fewer opportunities to make mistakes than
states that do not.1 31 As food stamp programs begin to look more and
more state-specific, a national standard for error becomes less
meaningful.
D. Determining Income is the Largest Source of Error

Due in part to the way it is calculated, earned income is the most
common and costliest source of error.1 32 Food stamp benefits are
calculated either retrospectively or prospectively. Retrospective
budgeting uses the actual reported income and circumstances of a
previous month to establish the level of food stamps for the current
month.1 33 Prospective budgeting uses the anticipated income that the
household and agency "are reasonably certain will be received" and
circumstances of the current month to establish the level of stamps for
that month."3 Until recently, most working families were required to
126. SUPER, supra note 48, at 4.

127. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 18 (showing that over forty states have waivers
or requests pending on reporting issues alone).
128. The USDA may waive any statutory requirement as part of a project to increase
efficiency or improve delivery of benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b).
129. VIVIAN GABOR & CHRISTOPHER BOTSKO, USDA, STATE FOOD STAMP POLICY

CHOICES UNDER WELFARE REFORM 11-30, 34-35 (1998).
130. 7 C.F.R. § 275.3(c) (2000).
131. USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 23.
132. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 17.
133. 7 C.F.R. § 273 (2000).
134. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(c)(1) (2000).
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report changes of income exceeding $25 per month under either
method.35 Reporting can be a significant burden-if the household
fails to notify the food stamp agency in a timely way or the agency
fails to verify, the state may be charged an error (and if the household
is at fault, it's eligibility may be jeopardized). Beginning in mid-1999,
the USDA began waiving certain reporting requirements because of
the concern that increasing employment among food stamp
households would lead to increasing errors. In little over one year, 43
states had waivers approved. 136 The trend away from burdensome
reporting is a welcome one, but should be made a permanent part of
the regulatory process.
E. Administration is Expensive and Difficult

One of the main sources of error, identified in a recent study, is a
state's failure to act on a participant's reported changes in a timely
manner.' 37 Failure to process a change that affects benefit levels is a
QC error.35 Administrators in states that require frequent reports
face mountains of paperwork and sometimes just cannot process the
information quickly enough to avoid an error.
Poor state
administration policies, like insufficient staffing or requiring too much
reporting, may also be a factor that delays the processing of changes.
F. External Factors Beyond the Control of Administering Agencies Have
Significant Influence on Error Rates

Some states have a disproportionately high number of errorprone households and thus, face higher sanctions simply because of
the characteristics of the state's population. As noted above,
households with earned income are error-prone, as are immigrants
because recent legislative changes in eligibility require extensive
documentation of immigrant status for each member of the
household as well as a work history for adults. Since the 1996 welfare
changes to immigrant eligibility for food stamps, error rates for
households with immigrants rose from 10.2% in 1996 to 16.6% in
1998. In contrast, only 9.7% of households without immigrants were
a source of error in 1998.' 39 Since households can contain citizen
children, ineligible and eligible legal immigrants and undocumented
135. Some states, including California, still require monthly reporting, even if there is
no change in income or other eligibility status. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 19.
136. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 14.
137. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 7 (the other commonly
identified sources of error are worker miscalculations and household failure to report,
both discussed above).
138. Id.
139. SUPER, supranote 48, at 5.
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immigrants, determining the correct status of all members can be a
common source of error. Some states have actively sought to reach
immigrants by conducting culturally sensitive outreach and even
creating state-funded food stamp programs for those no longer
federally eligible.14 Similarly, states that have encouraged working
families to apply for food stamps, if successful, are likely to have
higher error rates than those that do not. The USDA recently
adjusted state sanctions to account for households with high numbers
of working poor and immigrants, discounting the proportion of errors
due to higher caseloads of households with earned income or
immigrants.14'
State-specific adjustments, similar to those made for working
families and immigrants, could be used to tailor the threshold for
sanctions to reflect other unique state circumstances. Additional
adjustments could take into account levels of unemployment, general
economic conditions and additional demographic characteristics like
elderly and disabled participants.
Changes in state welfare programs have affected state operation
of the Food Stamp Program, as well as the characteristics of those
receiving food stamps. There has been a well documented but poorly
explained drop in food stamp participation among households leaving
state welfare programs (either because they no longer are eligible, or
have found work or reach the time limit). 4 Most observers suggest
that the majority of these families remain eligible for food stamps, but
many opt out because of the burden of participating. Some may
believe they are no longer eligible for food stamps."' In some ways,
this represents a breakdown in the administration of the two
programs: otherwise eligible households are losing food stamp
benefits because of procedural failures. Federal oversight alone, even
without fiscal sanctions, could shed light on this problem.
V. Improving the QC System
Reauthorization of the Food Stamp Program, scheduled for 2002
as part of the Farm Bill, provides a unique opportunity to improve
the monitoring of the program. While some steps should certainly be
taken to reduce the one-sided pressure on states to limit payment
140. GABOR & BOTSKO, supra note 129, at 33.
141. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, RAPID ACTION NEEDED BY USDA ON
ADJUSTMENTS TO STATE QUALITY CONTROL LIABILITIES 1 (2000). Under current

policy, the baseline against which state caseloads are compared to determine if they are
serving high percentages of immigrants and working families, fails to accurately capture
actual caseload changes.
142. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS, NUTRITION AND EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 19.
143. Id. at 36-7.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

errors, Congress should consider ways of monitoring other important
aspects of the program. In the initial round of reauthorization
proposals, food stamp QC has received some attention. The House
Agriculture Committee passed a bill that adjusts the QC system to
relieve some of the pressure on states by limiting sanctions to a few
outlying poor-performing states' 4 The Senate has yet to take up the
issue though a broad-based reform bill does contain proposed
changes to food stamp QC. 4'
A. Because the Goal of the Food Stamp Program is Broader than Payment
Accuracy, Performance Measures Should Include More Than QC

Any attempt to measure the effectiveness of the Food Stamp
Program must keep the purpose of the program in mind-to prevent
hunger and improve nutrition among low-income households.
Currently, the program creates disincentives to try to serve all those
eligible within a state because attempting to do so would likely result
in an increase in errors, placing a state at risk for fiscal sanctions. The
current system rewards a state that serves only 1% of its eligible
population but provides perfectly accurate benefits to that 1%, while
it penalizes a state that serves 95% of its eligible population but has
an error rate above the national average. Arguably, the latter state
more closely fulfills the goals of the Food Stamp Program.
The USDA should provide incentives for states to reach a higher
percentage of eligible candidates. One way to do this is to codify the
USDA's current practice of adjusting the error rates of states serving
high or increasing numbers of working and immigrant households.' 6
Alternatively, the USDA could provide enhanced funding or
increased flexibility in administering the program.' A state's success
in issuing benefits within the thirty day limit, as required by statute,
should be rewarded. Other measurable standards that reflect the
broader purpose of the program include: improvements in health and
nutrition among participants, outreach and program accessibility for
other targeted populations (like the elderly who often face high living
costs on fixed incomes), placements in job training and success in
moving recipients toward self-sufficiency.
Additionally, the emphasis on overpayments and underpayments
as the measure of error should be expanded to include other
144. Agricultural Act of 2001, H.R. 2646, 107th Cong. § 404 (2001). The bill has passed
the House Agricultural Committee and is scheduled to reach the floor in October 2001.
145. Leave No Child Behind Act of 2001, S. 940, 107th Cong. § 6108 (2001).
146. As of August 21, 2001, such a proposal is contained in Senate Bill 940, but not in
House Bill 2646.
147. Both of the current legislative proposals provide "excellence bonus payments" to
the highest performing and most improved states. S. 940 § 6108(a)(5); H.R. 2646 §
404(a)(5).
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important indicators, such as terminations and denials. A commission
appointed by Congress in the mid-1980's recommended four
categories of payment errors and suggested weighting the measures to
reflect current priorities: benefits to noneligible people, overissuances
to eligible people, underissuances to eligible people and nonissuances
to eligible people." The incorrect nonissuance of benefits ought to
be examined as closely as the issuance of benefits to ensure that
eligibility administrators do not improperly deny benefits. In fiscal
year 2000, state error rates for wrongful denial and termination were
verified by the USDA for the first time. Almost 6% of all denials and
terminations were found to be in error. 49

The USDA has not

calculated the amount of food stamps improperly denied to these
households, thus, this error rate cannot be incorporated into the
combined error rate used to measure performance."' While reporting
the amount of incorrect denials and terminations is a start, without
the threat of fiscal sanctions, states are unlikely to pay careful
attention.
B. Even Within the Narrow Measure of QC, Accuracy Can Be Achieved
Without Harmful Effects

Simply adjusting the current threshold for imposing sanctions
from the national average to either a fixed percentage of error or a
level above the national average would focus sanctions on the few
truly under-performing states and provide opportunities to those
states with generally average performance to develop non-harmful
policies aimed at lowering error rates."'
Providing states an opportunity to make needed improvements
without fiscal penalty would bring the QC system in line with the rest
of the Food Stamp Program." A policy to hold states harmless while
they take active steps to bring error rates down would prevent the
imposition of arbitrary penalties and instead, provide an incentive for
states to act quickly and decisively.'53 Pennsylvania's one year jump
above the threshold (described above) would not trigger an
immediate sanction under such a policy. Other states have faced one
or two year sanctions, yet have consistently held their error rates
148. RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL, supra note 62, at 150.
149. SUPER, supranote 48, at 1.
150. See 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c) (2000) for the definition of "combined error rate."
151. Both bills set the level at which sanctioning begins at the national average plus 1%.
The USDA retains the authority to sanction any state if administration of the program is
negligent regardless of error rate. H.R. 2646 § 404(a)(4); S. 940 § 6108(a)(1)(C).
152. No other part of the Food Stamp Program is subject to such a comprehensive fiscal
sanctioning system.
153. Sanctions under both the House and Senate proposals would not be imposed until
the third consecutive year.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53

close to the existing threshold 4 Sanctioning states that consistently
exceed the threshold focuses penalties on only the under-performing
states.
In addition, only states with error rates statistically beyond the
margin of error from the threshold should be penalized, providing a
small buffer to account for variations in sampling. Assigning
sanctions only when there is a high statistical certainty that the state's
error rate does, in fact, exceed the threshold would further relieve
pressure on states to constantly reduce their error rates. 55
C.

Changing the Reporting Structure Through Administrative Options

As an alternative to the current certification and reporting
requirements, the USDA has offered waivers that give states the
option of adopting quarterly rather than monthly reports and of
reducing the amount of information that must be reported between
certifications in states adopting periodic reporting.1 6 All but ten
states have chosen at least one form of reduced reporting, suggesting7
that these states recognize the QC benefit of these new options.'
Several of the states that have not sought a waiver still require
monthly reports from households without any evidence that these
monthly reports result in lower error rates." In fact, only one of
these states has ever had an error rate low enough to qualify for
enhanced funding (Mississippi) and that occurred just in the last three
years. 59 The USDA has also begun approving waivers that allow
states to recertify households through the mail, so long as an inperson interview takes place once a year.
Most importantly, the new reporting options reduce errors
because the state is not liable for errors caused by changes the state
does not require the household to report. In other words, an error
only occurs when required information is incorrect--the less that is
required, the fewer opportunities for error. Reporting options
require less information than a full recertification, thus providing less
opportunity for household or agency error. If a state uses a reporting
154. For example, Iowa faced sanctions for exceeding the national average when its
error rate jumped from 9.8% in 1997 to 13.37% in 1998 even though its error rate dropped
back below the national average in 1999. See USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at
13.
155. Both House Bill 2646 and Senate Bill 940 would only impose sanctions when there
is a 95% certainty that the state's error rate exceeds the threshold. H.R. 2646; S. 940.
156. See USDA, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, Universal Quarterly Reporting
Waivers (Jan. 11, 2001)(on file with author); USDA, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE,
Treatment of UnearnedIncome from PrivateSources (Jan. 11, 2001)(on file with author).
157. ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 18.
158. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 80, at 15.

159. USDA QC REPORT 1999, supra note 1, at 13.
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system that only requires essential information, it can be assured that
eligibility and benefit levels are accurate without unduly burdening
the household and at the same time, reducing its exposure to error.
Waivers that have proven to be successful in limiting errors without
discouraging participation should be codified.
D. Reexamining the Effectiveness of QC in an Era of State Discretion
The narrow focus of QC on payment accuracy raises the question
of whether QC is even the most appropriate means of monitoring and
improving the Food Stamp Program. Clearly, the program's goal of
increasing the food purchasing power of low-income households is
broader than just ensuring that those in the program get the right
amount of benefits. Beyond that, the program may have objectives
and goals that contradict each other. Historically, eligibility for the
program has repeatedly expanded to reflect congressional and public
interest in combating hunger. At the same time, the aim of the QC
system has been to tighten eligibility and minimize overissuances.W
Recognizing that "it may be difficult for program managers to
undertake aggressive outreach and intake procedures... without at
the same time loosening up eligibility procedures" is a first step in
overhauling the QC system.
Significant changes in the fundamental structure of government
assistance programs also affect the effectiveness of QC. The Food
Stamp Program remains one of the last rules-based government
benefit programs after welfare reform. In 1996, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA") repealed the national AFDC program and replaced it
with TANF, a funding stream that gives states
almost TN
unlimited
162
a
discretion in creating cash assistance programs. Notably, TANF has
no QC requirements attached to the block granting of funds.'63 As
states implement their newly designed cash assistance programs, they
are turning to outcome-based and performance evaluations rather
than payment error rates' What has begun to emerge from the fifty
state experiments in cash assistance are programs that pass federallygranted discretion and flexibility down to counties and individual
160. RETHINKING QUALITY CONTROL, supra note 62,126.
161. Id. at 127.
162- See MARK GREENBERG & STEVE SAVNER, CTR. FOR LAW AND

A

SOCIAL POLICY,
DETAILED SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR

NEEDY FAMILIES BLOCK GRANT OF H.R. 3734, at 1-4 (1996).
163. Id at 25-35 (describing the restrictions on use of federal funding and penalties for
states and showing that the very structure of a block grant precludes any federal measure
of payment accuracy or error rates).
164. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:Rules, Discretion, and
EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1125-28 (2000).
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eligibility administrators.165 States exert their authority through
funding incentives and performance-based measures, but front line
agency staff generally have tremendous discretion.' 66 Around the
same time welfare devolved to the states, the expansion of health
insurance to low-income families was accomplished through the
creation of another funding stream to the states, the State Child
Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP"), rather than an expansion of
the existing federal rules-based program, Medicaid. 7 In a way
similar to TANF, SCHIP provides maximum flexibility for states to
design their own health insurance programs.' 6'
Though the Food Stamp Program remains a federally regulated
program, Congess has been faced with pressure to increase state
autonomy and control. 9 The increasing number and scope of waivers
granted to states, as well as significant options provided to states in
the PRWOA, reflect a trend towards increased state control.
Further, as states develop food stamp programs that look more and
more unique, the ability to draw any meaningful conclusions from
national data (one of the strengths of the current QC system)
weakens.
It is not difficult to find ways to fundamentally improve the
monitoring of the Food Stamp Program. While TANF has no error
measure, it does provide "bonus" funding to states that reach certain
program objectives.'70 These objectives, against which states are
measured, include job entry rates for participants, success in the work
force, family stability and the ways in which the state's TANF
program supports work and self-sufficiency. 7'

Contrast these

measures with the sole measure for food stamp "enhanced
funding"-a combined error rate below six percent. Even more
remarkable, the measure to establish TANF performance bonuses for
165. Id. at 1126-28.
166. Id.
167. FAMILIES USA, ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: CHILDREN'S HEALTH
COVERAGE AFTER CHIP AND WELFARE REFORM 1-3 (1999).
168. The Medicaid system has long focused only on benefits to noneligibles, in part
because the real payment and QC issues are found in the reimbursement structure used to
pay doctors and hospitals. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL
MEDICAID
FRAUD
AND
ABUSE
INITIATIVE
BACKGROUND,
available at
http:llwww.hcfa.gov/medicaidlfraudlbackgrnd.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2001).
169. AM. PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES ASS'N, CROSSROADS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SOCIAL POLICY 46-47 (2000).
170. GREENBERG & SAVNER, supra note 162, at 37.
171. USDA, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, Food Stamp Program-TANF High
Performance Bonus Funding (Dec. 13, 1999)(on file with author). While there is some
fear that these measures encourage states to overemphasize work, rather than training or
support services, they serve to show that other measures of program performance are not
hard to find.
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work support and self-sufficiency is "participation by low-income
working families in the Food Stamp Program..." in recognition of
the importance of food stamps as a work support." Twenty million
dollars will be granted to states that show the most improvement in
the percentage of low-income working families receiving food stamps
compared to the number of low-income working families in the state.
That a measure of food stamp participation by working families exists
in TANF, but not in the Food Stamp Program, shows the
obsolescence of the current monitoring system.
Creating a number of "bonus" payment incentives that reward
states successfully achieving important program goals, like high rates
of participation and increased nutrition, would remove some of the
fiscal pressure on states under the current sanction system. If a state
places a higher priority on reaching at-risk populations than on
receiving additional funds, the USDA has no way of recognizing,
much less rewarding, this state choice.
Conclusion
As a federal rules-based program, the Food Stamp Program has
retained a QC system that attempts to measure agency performance
based on whether the state has complied with the rules. The Food
Stamp Program fits poorly with the new environment at local welfare
agencies, where it is difficult to assign error to an administrator with
significant discretion regarding the eligibility and options available to
a household. The current food stamp monitoring system is also too
narrowly focused on payment accuracy to reflect the true purposes of
the program. By measuring only payment errors, other important
goals of the program are neglected. Not surprisingly, as the
composition of those eligible for the program includes more and more
working poor, the current way of measuring the program fails to
adapt. States enact policies that lower error rates, but those policies
may also discourage those the program aims to serve from
participating. In the end, emphasis on a narrow definition of quality
distorts incentives to make program improvements. Without these
needed improvements, the program will continue to fail to serve
eligible and needy households.

172. Id.

